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An important class of investment decisions is characterized by unrecoverable sunk costs, resolution
of uncertainty through time, and the ability to invest in the future as an alternative to investing today.
The options model provides guidance in such settings, including an investment decision rule called
the “bad news principle”: the downside investment state influences the investment decision whereas
the upside investment state is ignored. This study takes a new approach to examining predictions of
the options model by using the tools of experimental economics. Our evidence, which is drawn from
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I.  Introduction 
Every day individuals decide whether to expend resources today or keep their options 
open until tomorrow.  Standard neoclassical investment models provide unequivocal advice in 
such situations:  invest when the present value of the project’s expected cash flow is at least as 
large  as  its  costs.    An  important  literature  using options  models  has  shown  that  this  rule  is 
incorrect when investment is irreversible, uncertainty is resolved through time, and investment 
can be postponed (see, e.g., Dixit, 1989, 1992; Pindyck, 1991; Dixit and Pindyck, 1994).  In such 
cases,  the  standard  investment  model  ignores  the  opportunity  cost  of  investing  today—i.e., 
current investment precludes not investing if bad news is observed, and therefore potentially 
provides  an  inferior  decision  rule.    One  interesting  manifestation  of  the  options  modeling 
approach is the “Bad News Principle” (hereafter BNP) first introduced by Bernanke (1983), 
which suggests that only the expected severity of future bad news matters in deciding whether 
one should invest in an asset today.  Indeed, the potential good news should have no effect on the 
temporal nature of an agent’s investment decision.  Intuitively, this asymmetry follows from the 
fact that an option to wait has no value when investing now is the correct decision.  
Despite the topic’s vast normative and positive implications, there has been a limited 
number of empirical studies examining the integrity of the options model.
1  Hubbard (1994; p. 
1829) highlights this fact when noting that “empirical research has not quite caught up with the 
rapidly changing theoretical developments in this literature.”  This is not surprising in light of the 
difficulties associated with executing a clean empirical test of such behavior.  Even when such 
data are available, too many theoretically relevant factors change simultaneously to allow a clean 
comparative static test.    
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  Experimentation  alleviates  many  of  these  problems  by  use  of  randomization,  and 
therefore  provides  an  attractive  approach  for  analyzing  the  behavioral  predictions  from  the 
options model.  Such an approach provides an opportunity for the researcher to vary important 
parameters while holding constant other elements that could affect investment decisions.  The 
experimental  method  thus  allows  the  researcher  to  study  the  comparative  static  effects  of 
changes in important parameters that are difficult to identify in naturally-occurring data.   
This paper follows this approach by first examining behavior of students in a controlled 
laboratory  experiment.    We  observe  an  asymmetrical  response  to  bad  versus  good  news:  
subjects are quite sensitive to changes in the “bad news” payoff state but are less responsive to 
changes in the high payoff state.  Finding evidence in favor of the option model’s predictions is 
consistent with a broad class of preference structures, however.  For example, students in the 
laboratory  are  often  found  to  exhibit  behavior  consonant  with  loss  aversion  (Kahneman  and 
Tversky, 1979), and therefore our findings may simply be evidence of this type of behavior in a 
different environment.  In this light, inference from these data should be made with great caution.   
This issue induces us to push the analysis in two different directions.  In the first, we 
recognize that recent research—from US housing markets, to Israeli and US stock markets, to 
smaller-scale product markets—suggests that trading professionals exhibit much less, if any, loss 
aversion (e.g., Genesove and Mayer, 2001; Shapira and Venezia 2000; Locke and Mann, 2004; 
List, 2003, 2004).  Such results suggest that finding a population of professional traders will 
permit a more demanding test of the options model.  Our search for professionals concluded 
when the Chicago Board of Trade (CBOT) agreed to provide i) access to professional futures and 
options pit traders and ii) space on the exchange to carry out our experiments.
2  Our second  
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approach uses a laboratory experiment with student subjects, but alters the payoff space:  all 
decisions are made over payments in the loss domain.  In this case, the intuition of the decision 
making process under the options model is similar, but the loss averse model yields different 
predictions because agents seek risk in the loss domain and have diminishing sensitivity. 
Overall, across both complementary approaches we find data consonant with the options 
model.  For example, market professionals’ are acutely aware of changes in the bad payoff state 
and ignore changes in the good payoff state.  Interestingly, we find that they behave differently 
from students:  market professionals are less sensitive to changes in both the low and high payoff 
states compared to students.  The finding of less sensitivity to the low state is consonant with the 
spirit of collecting data from professionals who are not loss averse, while the lower sensitivity to 
the high state suggests that market professionals might be following the options model more 
closely  than  the  students.    Turning  to  the  environment  wherein  all  decisions  are  made  over 
payments  in  the  loss  domain,  the  option  model  remains  with  significant  predictive  power; 
consonant with List (2003, 2004), however, there are hints of loss aversion among students.   
Our findings potentially have both positive and normative implications.  For example, the 
results provide a useful indication of the possibilities of a class of efficient policies to stimulate 
investment.  Moreover, they provide guidance on the appropriate normative modeling approach.  
From a methodological viewpoint, our findings highlight that there is meaningful behavioral 
economic research to be done by implementing experimental protocols with non-standard subject 
pools.  In this regard, a useful next step is to complete the empirical bridge between the lab and 
the field by exploring behavior in framed and natural field experiments that test predictions of 
the options model (see List, 2006, for an example over a different set of problems).    
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The  remainder  of  our  study  proceeds  as  follows.    Section  II  begins  with  a  brief 
background of the options model to motivate our experimental design.  Section III summarizes 
the experimental results.  Section IV concludes.  
II.  Background and Experimental Design 
We begin by outlining the two-period options model.  The exposition closely follows 
Dixit and Pindyck (1994).  Assume that agents are profit maximizing and are offered a contract 
that permits them to exercise the contract now, or to wait until period 2 when all uncertainty 
regarding outcomes is revealed before making the investment decision.  Further, assume that 
there is a fixed premium (cost) of the option, C, an initial payoff of X, and two possible payoffs 
H and L (representing “high” and “low”).  Players know that nature determines the payoff, and 
that the high (low) state occurs with probability p (1 – p), and payoff parameters are given by L < 
C < H. 
  The option of investing in the contract in the first (second) period is labeled O1 (O2).  The 
information sets in these periods are represented by I1 and I2.  Thus, (Oi|Ii) represents the choice 
of option i given the information i.  The standard options model predicts that a risk-neutral agent 
should invest in the contract in the first period only when the ex ante expected value of investing 
in  period  two  (EV(O2|O1))  is  less  than  the  expected  value  from  investing  in  period  one 
(EV(O1|O1)), where the expected value of investing in the first period is given by: 
  EV(O1|I1) = X + pH + (1-p)L – C .              (1) 
Calculation of the ex ante expected payoff in period two, EV(O2|I1), must take into account that if 
the agent delays the investment decision to the second period she forfeits the first period initial 
payoff, X.  She does not, however, forego the opportunity to invest in the second period upon  
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observing the true state.  The expected value in period one of delaying the investment choice to 
period two is therefore: 
EV(O2|I1) = p(H – C) +(1-p)(0) = pH – pC.            (2) 
Hence, the condition that triggers investment in the first period is: 
  X + pH + (1-p)L – C > pH – pC  or  X + (1-p)(L-C) > 0,      (3) 
because the pH terms cancel.  The equation reveals that the investment decision is purely a 
function of the investment cost (C), the initial payoff (X), the probability (p), and the downside 
risk (L).   
  A distinguishing feature of the options model is that while L is an argument in equation 
(3), H is not present.  Hence, an important comparative static prediction is that the expected 
severity of the bad state matters for first-period decision making, but the level of the payoff in 
the good state has no effect.  This manifestation has been termed the bad news principle (BNP; 
Bernanke, 1983) and represents an important prediction of the options model.  Our experimental 
design addresses whether the investment decision is driven by equation (3), and explores whether 
the  investment  decision  is  entirely  independent  of  all  upside  gain  considerations  (H)  but 
influenced by variations in L.   
Experimental Design  
Table  1  contains  a  summary  of  our  experimental  design,  which  closely  follows  the 
options framework discussed above and Bjornstad et al. (2003).  The parameter values and the 
expected values EV(O1|I1) and EV(O2|I1) implied by each contract are included.  The contract 
parameters were selected to pit the standard neoclassical investment model against the options 
model while simultaneously  allowing clean tests of the comparative static predictions of the 
options model.  For example, contract 1 in each triad is characterized by EV(O1|I1) < EV(O2|I1),  
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whereas the other contracts, 2 and 3, have EV(O1|I1) > EV(O2|I1).  And, H and L vary between 
the three contract types, permitting a test of the BNP.   
  Consider contract A1 more closely.  In this particular contract, the high payoff, H, was 
set at 12 units and the low payoff, L, was set at 1 unit.  Whether the contract paid H or L 
depended on the color of the ball drawn from a bingo cage, where the probability of H or L was 
identical (p = 0.5).  This information was common knowledge.  If the subject chose to buy the 
contract in period one, at a cost of C=10 units, then she immediately received a payment of X=3 
units.  Otherwise, she did not pay the cost of the contract and did not receive the immediate 
payment of 3 units.  After all participants made their choice of purchase/no purchase in period 
one, the bingo cage was spun and the color of the ball that fell out of the cage determined the 
payoff:  a dark ball meant that the contract would pay 12 additional units, whereas a light color 
ball meant that investing agents would receive 1 additional unit.  For those who did not invest in 
period  1,  a  decision  of  whether  to  invest  in  the  contract  was  made  after  the  outcome  was 
determined.   
  One important caveat to testing the options model via our approach is that a bulk of 
recent research has found evidence of loss aversion among students in the laboratory (see, e.g., 
Kahneman et al., 1990).  Such experimental findings have been robust across unfamiliar goods, 
such as irradiated sandwiches, and common goods, such as chocolate bars and coffee mugs.  In 
our case, this confound is potentially devastating, as a data pattern consistent with the BNP is 
also in line with loss aversion.  For example, the fact that students are more acutely aware of 
losses than comparably-sized gains can masquerade as evidence in favor of the options model.   
We offer two solutions.  One solution is to conduct controlled laboratory treatments with 
not only students but agents who are predicted to have little, or no, loss aversion.  A recent line  
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of research suggests that behavior consistent with loss aversion is attenuated, or even eliminated, 
among  those  agents  who  have  significant  market  experience  or  who  are  considered  market 
professionals (see, e.g., Knez et al., 1985; Coursey et al., 1987; Brookshire and Coursey, 1987; 
Myagkov and Plott, 1997; Genesove and Mayer, 2001; Shapira and Venezia 2000; Locke and 
Mann, 2004; List, 2003, 2004).
3  Accordingly, we perform a series of experimental treatments 
with market professionals that mirror the student treatments.   
Both  the  student  and  market  professionals  made  investment  decisions over  at  least  3 
contracts (A1-A3, B1-B3, C1-C3, or some combination).
4  To control for income effects and 
compound  lottery  effects,  we  made  all  contracts  monetarily  binding  in  some  sessions  and 
randomly chose one contract to be monetarily binding in other sessions (whereby agents made 
choices and were told that only one contract would be binding).
5  For those sessions where one 
contract was binding, the monetarily binding contract was randomly selected via a blind draw 
from a paper bag.  The terms of that binding contract were then fulfilled.  When examining data 
across the “all binding” and “one binding” treatments we found that for both the student and 
market  professional  populations,  behavior  is  not  different;  thus  we  pool  these  data  in  the 
empirical  analysis  below.
6    Finally,  we  varied  the  contract  sequencing  to  control  for  order 
effects, of which we found no evidence so we suppress further discussion.   
Before moving to our second approach to tackling the confound issue, we discuss some 
aspects of our student and trader design.  First, all experiments were run with pencil and paper.  
Second, when presenting the contracts we were careful to include the yields and details on how 
these yields are determined (the full experimental instructions are available upon request).  We 
also  explained  several  practice  contracts  before  beginning  the  experiment.    Participants’ 
questions were invited at this point.  Participants were then told that they would be given a  
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packet of contracts and were to make choices  between option 1 and option 2.  Each of the 
contracts was formatted exactly like the contracts in the examples, but differed in values of H 
and L (see Table 1).  Subjects made their option 1 and option 2 decisions for all contracts.  Note 
that for each of the contracts that subjects choose between option 1 and option 2 the outcome of 
that choice was disclosed before the next choice in the next contract was made. 
After  subjects  made  their  choices  and  the  outcome  of  each  contract  was  revealed, 
experimenters checked each subject’s choice to ensure that individual payoffs were correctly 
calculated.  Finally, in the market professional treatments the exchange rate was 4:1 (4 cents for 
each unit), and the student treatment exchange rate was 1:1 (1 cent for each unit).  Our decision 
to quadruple the exchange rate for the market professionals was based on a detailed discussion 
with CBOT officials about market professional earnings.
7  In total, we observe 531 decisions: 
279 observations from students and 252 from market professionals.
8   
Our second solution to the confounding issue is to use a standard laboratory experiment 
with student subjects but alter the payoff space to make all decisions over payments in the loss 
domain.  To implement this treatment, we simply transform the 9 contracts in Table 1 to be over 
losses.    We  do  this  by  initially  endowing  each  subject  with  a  starting  balance  of  $25  and 
ownership of a contract that pays -$10 with certainty.  Subjects are then told that they can trade 
their contract for another contract.  To form the other contracts, we combine X and negative 
values of H and L in a manner that ensures we are always in the loss domain.  The procedure is 
as follows:  in period 1, we simply transform H and L in Table 1 to be negative (i.e., 12 becomes 
-12 and 1 becomes -1).  In period 2, we again make H and L negative, but add -3 to both H and L 
(i.e., -15 and -4 result).  In this manner, considering that -15 will not result because the contracts 
will not be traded (agent will keep -10 rather than trading), the first decision in Table 1 becomes:    
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Option 1, trade the contract immediately.  Payoffs:      Heads:    -$12 
                Tails:    -$1 
 
Option 2, wait to trade until after coin flip is determined:    Heads:   -$10 
                  Tails:    -$4 
 
For the remainder of contracts and payoffs please see Table 1a.  Under this design, the intuition 
of the decision making process under the options model is similar, with changes in L, and not H, 
affecting the decision.  Intuitively, this asymmetry follows from the fact that an option to wait 
has no value when trading now is the correct decision.   
Recall that loss aversion is a behavioral manifestation that is captured by prospect theory, 
which  conjectures  that  a  value  function  exists  that  is  (i)  measured  over  deviations  from  a 
reference point, (ii) convex for losses and concave for gains, and (iii) initially steeper for losses 
than for gains.  Hence, a major conjecture of prospect theory is diminishing sensitivity, or that 
small  gains  are  disproportionately  more  attractive  relative  to  large  gains,  and  small  losses 
disproportionately aversive relative to large losses.  Intuitively, convexity of the value function 
in losses is motivated by the idea that the decline in value from a loss of $1100 to a loss of $1200 
is less than the decline in value from a loss of $100 to a loss of $200.  The implication is that in 
our experiment, unit changes near zero should influence decisions more than unit changes in the 
extreme—agents should be risk seeking in the loss domain. 
For ease of execution, and to maximize power, we simply provided each subject with 9 
binary choices, similar to our example above—the nine choices are provided in Table 1a.  And, 
similar to the student treatments above, our students were drawn from the undergraduate student  
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body of the University of Maryland.  Note that in this experiment we are making an important 
assumption:  subjects instantaneously integrate their assets so that we can couch our discussion 
in terms of losses (see Mason et al., 2005, for another experiment in this spirit).  Whether this 
assumption is valid remains an open empirical question.  In total, we observe 675 decisions—75 
students each making 9 choices.   
III.   Empirical Results 
We begin our discussion with a summary of the student and trader behavior within the 
standard options model game, and then proceed to a discussion of the experimental data over 
losses.  In doing so, we attempt to highlight both data consonant with the options model, as well 
as data outside of that model.   
A.  Student and Trader Behavior in the Standard Option Game 
Viewing the raw proportions of choices across the two options provides a useful first 
glimpse at the spirit of our empirical results.  Consider the graphical depiction in Figure 1, which 
provides an indication of the percentage of option 1 choices across treatments.  In these data 
summaries,  the  contracts  are  arranged  so  that  the  leftmost  bar  graphs  are  characterized  by 
EV(O1|I1) < EV(O2|I1) (i.e., contracts A1, B1, and C1).  The other bar charts are characterized by 
EV(O1|I1)  >  EV(O2|I1).    Accordingly,  vertical  comparisons  provide  insights  into  comparative 
static effects of changing the high payoff state whereas horizontal comparisons provide insights 
into the effects of changing the low payoff state.  Two aspects of the figures provide useful 
evidence.  First, consistent with the options model but at odds with the classical investment 
model, in B1 and C1 subjects tend to invest in option 2 considerably more often than they invest 
in option 1.
9  Second, there is evidence of bad and good news being treated asymmetrical by both  
  11 
students and market professionals:  while vertical comparisons yield some behavioral changes, 
contract preferences vary considerably when considering horizontal comparisons.   
While  casual  inspection  of  the  data  provides  an  indication  of  the  behavioral  patterns 
present in our data, a more rigorous statistical analysis is necessary to place confidence in the 
results.  Upon completing a more formal empirical analysis, we report a first result:   
Result 1:  Student behavior favors the options model over the classical model. 
Evidence  for  this  result  can  be  found  both  conditionally  and  unconditionally.    In  an 
unconditional sense, first consider the percentage of students choosing option 1 in B1 and C1:  
21 and 19 percent, respectively.  These percentages are significantly lower than the option 2 
percentages (79 and 81), providing evidence that considerably more students follow the options 
model than the classical model.  Second, consider the effect of a comparative static change of the 
lower payoff state level, L, and the upper payoff state level, H.  If the BNP holds, then changes 
in L should have an influence, while changes in H should have little impact.   
Table 2 provides summary empirical results from a series of Fishers exact tests exploring 
the comparative static predictions of the options model.  From the top panel results, we find that 
variations in H do not significantly influence contract choice in any of the cases—we can never 
reject the homogeneity null at conventional significance levels (for example, A1 versus C1 yields 
a p = 0.2930).  Alternatively, the lower panel in Table 2 highlights that for a variety of contract-
paired  comparisons  the  choice  of  option  1  (option  2)  varies  considerably.    The  data  pattern 
indicates that L does have a significant influence on choice of contract for students.   
While these results are certainly consistent with predictions from the options model, little 
has been done to control for the data dependencies (students provided more than one data point).   
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To control for the panel nature of the data set, we estimate a fixed effects logit model of the 
form:   
Option1it = Xitβ+ eit,    eit ~N[0,1],          (4) 
where Option1it equals unity if student i chose option 1 in choice t, and equals zero otherwise; Xit 
includes treatment variables L and H, and the variance of eit must be normalized because it can 
only be identified up to a scale factor.   
  Estimation results are contained in column 1 of Table 3.  Similar to insights gained from 
the unconditional tests, we learn from this model that the level of the low payoff state, L, has a 
significant influence on student choice.  Indeed, the value of the low payoff state is statistically 
significant at the p < .01 level.  Alternatively, the level of the high payoff state, H, has a much 
less  important  influence  on  decisions—a  coefficient  less  than  1/3  the  magnitude  of  the  low 
payoff state.  These insights lend evidence in favor of the options model, but as previously noted 
this behavior is also consistent with loss-averse student agents focusing in finer detail on the loss 
domain than the gain domain.  Our next result addresses this issue: 
Result 2:  Market professional behavior is consonant with predictions from the options 
model. 
Consider first the raw data as evidence for this result (Table 4 and Figure 1):  while not as 
distinct as students, the percentage of market professionals choosing option 1 in B1 and C1 (42 
and 31 percent) is smaller than market professionals choosing option 2 (58 and 69 percent).  
Next, consider Table 4, which provides summary empirical results using a series of Fishers exact 
tests.  Much like the student data, we find that variations in the high payoff state, H, do not 
significantly influence contract choice in any of the cases, whereas the lower panel in Table 4  
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illustrates that for a number of contracts, variation in the low payoff state, L, influences contract 
choice, though to a much lesser extent than we find for students.   
Column 2 in Table 3 provides regression evidence that reinforces this insight.  These 
results are obtained from estimating equation (4).  The estimates suggest that the level of the low 
payoff state, L, has a significant influence on market professionals’ choices (at the p < .01 level), 
whereas  the  level  of  the  high  payoff  state,  H,  does  not  have  a  significant  influence  at 
conventional levels.   Interestingly, the market professionals are seemingly less responsive to 
payoff changes than students.  For example, the coefficient estimate on the low payoff state in 
the market professional’s model (0.49) is considerably smaller than the coefficient estimate in 
the student model (0.72).  Simply stated, market professionals do exhibit behavior consistent 
with the BNP, but to a slightly lesser degree than students.  Our preferred interpretation is that 
this result suggests that loss aversion is more prevalent among the students than the market 
professionals.  Yet, this comparison can be pushed a bit further; doing so leads to our next result: 
Result 3:  Students and market professionals behave differently. 
Evidence for this result can be found in a comparison of the data across subject type.  First, as 
illustrated  in  Figure  1,  students  appear  more  loyal  to  the  options  model  than  market 
professionals:    in  both  B1  and  C1,  students  choose  option  1  considerably  less  than  market 
professionals (B1: 21 percent versus 42 percent; C1: 19 percent versus 31 percent).  Second a 
vertical and horizontal comparison of the bars in Figure 1 provides some evidence that there are 
behavioral differences.   
To  push  the  comparison  of  market  professionals  and  students  further,  we  estimate 
equation (4) using H and L in Xit and include a fully interactive model by pooling the data.  
Empirical estimates, which are contained in column 3 of Table 3, provide support for the ocular  
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differences  observed  in  Figure  1.    The  coefficient  on  Student*High  Payoff  is  statistically 
significant at conventional levels, suggesting that students are influenced much more by changes 
in the high payoff than market professionals.  This result sheds light on an important prediction 
of  the  options  model  across  subject  type.    Furthermore,  we  find  that  the  coefficient  on  the 
interaction  Student*Low  Payoff  is  statistically  significant  at  the  p  <  .10  level.    This  result 
suggests that both students and market professionals are influenced by the downside investment 
state, although students are more sensitive than professionals.  As previously noted, while we 
cannot pinpoint exactly why this latter result occurs, it is consonant with previous empirical 
evidence on the degree of loss aversion across students and market professionals.
10   
As a first robustness test it is important to note that contract A1 differs from all other 
choices in that this contract has a negative expected value for round 1 investments.  Figure 1 
shows that this appears to have deterred students, but not market professionals, from investing in 
round 1.  As a consequence, for treatments with H=12, students might look more responsive than 
market  professionals  to  changes  in  L.    While  our  preferred  interpretation  of  the  difference 
between students and market professionals for sensitivities to changes in L is loss aversion, it 
would be interesting to know if this result is solely driven by contract A1.  We re-estimated 
equation  (4)  excluding  the  A1  observations  and  the  results  are  qualitatively  similar  to  the 
estimates in column 3 of Table 3.   
As a further robustness test, we explored survey information that was collected on-site at 
CBOT at the same time the experiments were conducted.  Specifically, we focused on CBOT 
market professionals and personal trading experience.  If loss aversion is attenuated among the 
experienced  traders,  and  it  is  one  reason  for  the  disparate  results  across  professionals  and 
students, then in these data we should find that the less experienced traders are more influenced  
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by the changes in L than the experienced traders.
11  This is exactly what we find:  while both 
groups  show  evidence  of  BNP,  the  lesser  experienced  traders  are  more  responsive.    This 
represents suggestive evidence in favor of our working hypothesis.   
B.  Experiment in the Loss Domain 
A further robustness test is to explore data from the experiment purely over losses.  In 
Figure 2 we present the results in a parallel manner to those presented above.  Figure 2 shows 
that, consistent with the options model, there is evidence of bad and good news being treated 
asymmetrical.  Vertical comparisons yield some behavioral changes, but contract preferences 
vary considerably when making horizontal comparisons.  For example, whereas the proportion of 
agents choosing option 1 in contract A3, B3, and C3, is 87%, 76%, and 83%, the proportion 
choosing option 1 in the other contracts is much lower, between 4% and 19%.  Alternatively, 
vertical differences are generally less, never greater than a 12% difference.  
Even though the aggregate data are in accord with the options model, we can supplement 
this result by examining individual choices, focusing on the number of subjects who maximize 
expected value, and the number who are risk seeking over losses.  The majority of subjects—42 
or  75—or  56%,  are  expected  value  maximizers  in  each  of  the  nine  questions,  effectively 
following the options model exactly.  Yet, similar to the results in List (2003; 2004; 2006), there 
are  some  subjects  who  show  hints  of  loss  aversion:    roughly  10%  of  agents  nearly  follow 
expected  value  maximization,  choosing  a  contract  with  the  higher  variance  rather  than  the 
contract with the lowest expected value in at least one decision.   
IV.  Epilogue 
Investment theory has been one of the richest areas of research in economics over the 
past several decades.  Seminal advances by Bernanke, Dixit, Pindyck, and others in the 1980s  
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and 1990s served to question the empirical foundation of the standard neoclassical investment 
model.    Scholars  soon  recognized  that  an  important  class  of  investment  decisions  within 
economics  invalidated  predictions  of  the  standard  investment  model.    In  particular,  when 
investment is characterized by unrecoverable sunk costs, resolution of uncertainty through time, 
and the ability to invest in the future as an alternative to investing today, the standard model 
oftentimes provides erroneous prescriptions.  In such cases, an options model more appropriately 
guides investment choices.  
In this study we pit the standard model against the options model by exploring behavior 
in simple investment games in the laboratory.  We use both undergraduate students and market 
professionals from the Chicago Board of Trade as experimental participants.  Several insights 
follow.  Most importantly, there is evidence that behavior of both subject types is more in accord 
with predictions from the options model than the classical investment model.  In particular, there 
is some evidence suggesting that both students and CBOT market professionals follow the “Bad 
News Principle,” an important manifestation of the options model.  Yet we find some evidence 
that market professionals and students behave differently—students are much more responsive to 
payoff changes than market professionals.   
If  these  laboratory  results  are  a  reliable  indicator  of  behavior  in  the  field,  then  they 
represent an important advance in several dimensions.  For example, they speak to a broad range 
of positive and normative issues, including the correct policy to stimulate investment and the 
appropriate normative  modeling approach.  Moreover, our research findings complement the 
extant  evidence  that  indicates  intense  market  experience  is  important  in  reducing  behavioral 
anomalies.  
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Table 1. Contract, Parameters, and Expected Values for Contracts 
  Parameter Value  EV(O1|I1)  EV(O2|I1) 
Contract  X  H  L  C     
A1  3  12  1  10  -0.5  1 
A2  3  12  5  10  1.5  1 
A3  3  12  7  10  2.5  1 
             
B1  3  16  1  10  1.5  3 
B2  3  16  5  10  3.5  3 
B3  3  16  7  10  4.5  3 
             
C1  3  20  1  10  3.5  5 
C2  3  20  5  10  5.5  5 
C3  3  20  7  10  6.5  5 
Table 1 summarizes the experimental design.  X is the initial period payoff, H is the high payoff in the future, 
, L is the low payoff in the future, and C is the fixed cost of the contract. Contracts in bold represent cases 
where the expected payoff in option 2 is greater than the expected payoff in option 1. 
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Table 1a.  Choice Questions for Experiment in the Loss Domain 
1.    
Option 1, trade the contract immediately.  Payoffs:      Heads:    -$12 
                Tails:    -$5 
Option 2, wait to trade until after coin flip is determined:    Heads:   -$10 
                  Tails:    -$8 
2.   
Option 1, trade the contract immediately.  Payoffs:      Heads:    -$12 
                Tails:    -$7 
Option 2, wait to trade until after coin flip is determined:    Heads:   -$10 
                  Tails:    -$10 
3.   
Option 1, trade the contract immediately.  Payoffs:      Heads:    -$16 
                Tails:    -$1 
Option 2, wait to trade until after coin flip is determined:    Heads:   -$10 
                  Tails:    -$4 
4.   
Option 1, trade the contract immediately.  Payoffs:      Heads:    -$16 
                Tails:    -$5 
Option 2, wait to trade until after coin flip is determined:    Heads:   -$10 
                  Tails:    -$8 
5.   
Option 1, trade the contract immediately.  Payoffs:      Heads:    -$16 
                Tails:    -$7 
Option 2, wait to trade until after coin flip is determined:    Heads:   -$10 
                  Tails:    -$10 
6.   
Option 1, trade the contract immediately.  Payoffs:      Heads:    -$20 
                Tails:    -$1 
Option 2, wait to trade until after coin flip is determined:    Heads:   -$10 
                  Tails:    -$4 
7.   
Option 1, trade the contract immediately.  Payoffs:      Heads:    -$20 
                Tails:    -$5 
Option 2, wait to trade until after coin flip is determined:    Heads:   -$10 
                  Tails:    -$8 
8.   
Option 1, trade the contract immediately.  Payoffs:      Heads:    -$20 
                Tails:    -$7 
Option 2, wait to trade until after coin flip is determined:    Heads:   -$10 
                  Tails:    -$10 
9.   
Option 1, trade the contract immediately.  Payoffs:      Heads:    -$12 
                Tails:    -$1  
  26 
Option 2, wait to trade until after coin flip is determined:    Heads:   -$10 
                  Tails:    -$4 
Payoffs for each of the nine contracts are presented for both Option 1 and 2.  For example, for choice question #9, if 
the subject chooses Option 1, then she receives a payment of -$12 if the coin is flipped heads, and -$1 if the coin flip 
is tails.  If she chooses Option 2, then she receives a payment of -$10 if the coin is flipped heads, and -$4 if the coin 
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Table 2. The Effect of Raising High (upper panel) and Low (lower panel) Payoff on Choice 
of Contract: Students             
 
High 
X=3, L=1, C=10 
  Proportion Picking:  A1  B1  C1 
Option 1  Option 2 
A1 (H = 12)  2/24 (8%)  22/24 (92%)  -  [0.2772]  [0.2930] 
B1 (H = 16)  7/33 (21%)  26/33 (79%)  -    [1.0000] 
C1 (H = 20)  7/36 (19%)  29/36 (81%)  -  -  - 
X=3, L=5, C=10 
  Proportion Picking:  A2  B2  C2 
Option 1  Option 2 
A2 (H = 12)  16/24 (67%)  8/24 (33%)  -  [0.2885]  [1.0000] 
B2 (H = 16)  17/33 (52%)  16/33 (48%)  -    [0.1460] 
C2 (H = 20)  25/36 (69%)  11/36 (31%)  -  -  - 
X=5, L=7, C=10 
  Proportion Picking:  A3  B3  C3 
Option 1  Option 2 
A3 (H = 12)  20/24 (83%)  4/24 (17%)  -  [0.4390]  [0.7018] 
B3 (H = 16)  30/33 (91%)  3/33 (9%)  -    [[1.0000] 
C3 (H = 20)  32/36 (89%)  4/36 (11%)  -  -  - 
Low 
X=3, H=12, C=10 
  Proportion Picking:  A1  A2  A3 
Option 1  Option 2 
A1 (L = 1)  2/24 (8%)  22/24 (92%)  -  [0.0000]***  [0.0000]*** 
A2 (L = 5)  16/24 (67%)  8/24 (33%)  -    [0.3177] 
A3 (L = 7)  20/24 (83%)  4/24 (17%)  -     
X=3, H=16, C=10 
  Proportion Picking:  B1  B2  B3 
Option 1  Option 2 
B1 (L=1)  7/33 (21%)  26/33 (79%)  -  [0.0200]**  [0.0000]*** 
B2 (L=5)  17/33 (52%)  16/33 (48%)  -    [0.0000]*** 
B3 (L=7)  30/33 (91%)  3/33 (9%)  -  -  - 
X=3, H=20, C=10 
  Proportion Picking:  C1  C2  C3 
Option 1  Option 2 
C1 (L=1)  3/24 (13%)  21/24 (87%)  -  [0.0000]***  [0.0000]*** 
C2 (L=5)  25/36 (69%)  11/36 (31%)  -    [0.0800]* 
C3 (L=7)  32/36 (89%)  4/36 (11%)  -  -  - 
Table  2  displays  summary  empirical  results  from  a  series  of  Fishers  exact  tests,  exploring  comparative  static 
predictions of the options model for each contract. p-values (in brackets) are associated with Fishers exact test of 
differences between contract choices of option 1 (option 2). *, **, *** indicate significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% 
level, respectively.  Contracts in bold represent those contracts where the expected payoff in option 2 is greater than 
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Table 3.  Regression Results 
   
  Specification   
Variable  (Students) (Market Professionals)  (Pooled) 
 
High Payoff  0.22  -0.06  -0.06 
  (0.12)  (0.08)  (0.08) 
 
Low Payoff  0.72  0.49  0.49 
  (0.10)  (0.09)  (0.09) 
 
Student*High Payoff  ---  ---  0.28 
      (0.13) 
 
Student*Low Payoff  ---  ---  0.23 
      (0.13) 
 
χ
2  113.9 (2 d.f.)*  44.1 (2 d.f.)*  158 (4 d.f.)* 
 
Subject Fixed   Yes  Yes  Yes 
Effects 
 
N  279  252  531 
Notes: 
1.  Dependent variable is the contract choice, where it equals unity if the agent chose option 1 in choice t, and equals 
zero otherwise.  Student is the student indicator variable that equals 1 if the subject was a student, 0 otherwise.  
Student*payoff is the student indicator variable interacted with the low or high payoff variable. 
2.  All specifications include individual specific fixed effects.  Standard errors are in parentheses. 
3.  The χ
2 values provide evidence of the models’ explanatory power.  In all cases our models are significant at the p 
< .01 level.  
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Table 4. The Effect of Raising High (upper panel) and Low (lower panel) Payoff on Choice 
of Contract: Market Professionals 
 
            High  
X=3, L=1, C=10 
  Proportion Picking:  A1  B1  C1 
Option 1  Option 2 
A1 (H = 12)  7/18 (39%)  11/18 (61%)  -  [1.000]  [0.7289] 
B1 (H = 16)   21/50 (42%)  29/50 (58%)  -  -  [0.5616] 
C1 (H = 20)  5/16 (31%)  11/16 (69%)  -  -  - 
X=3, L=5, C=10 
  Proportion Picking:  A2  B2  C2 
Option 1  Option 2 
A2 (H = 12)  14/18 (78%)  4/18 (22%)  -  [0.7613]  [0.4569] 
B2 (H = 16)   36/50 (72%)   14/50 (28%)  -  -  [0.5378] 
C2 (H = 20)  10/16 (63%)  6/16 (37%)  -  -  - 
X=5, L=7, C=10 
  Proportion Picking:  A3  B3  C3 
Option 1  Option 2 
A3 (H = 12)  15/18 (83%)  3/18 (17%)  -  [0.7449]  [0.2497] 
B3 (H = 16)  39/50 (78%)  11/50 (22%)  -  -  [0.3238] 
C3 (H = 20)  10/16 (63%)  6/16 (37%)  -  -  - 
Low 
X=3, H=12, C=10 
  Proportion Picking:  A1  A2  A3 
Option 1  Option 2 
A1 (L = 1)  7/18 (39%)  11/18 (61%)  -       [0.0409]**       [0.0153]** 
A2 (L = 5)  14/18 (78%)  4/18 (22%)  -  -    [1.0000] 
A3 (L = 7)  15/18 (83%)  3/18 (17%)  -  -  - 
X=3, H=16, C=10 
  Proportion Picking:  B1  B2  B3 
Option 1  Option 2 
B1 (L=1)  21/50 (42%)  29/50 (58%)  -         [0.0044]***        [0.0000]*** 
B2 (L=5)  36/50 (72%)  14/50 (28%)  -  -  [0.6447] 
B3 (L=7)  39/50 (78%)  11/50 (22%)  -  -  - 
X=3, H=20, C=10 
  Proportion Picking:  C1  C2  C3 
Option 1  Option 2 
C1 (L=1)  5/16 (31%)  11/16 (69%)  -  [0.1556]   [0.1556] 
C2 (L=5)  10/16 (63%)  6/16 (37%)  -  -  [1.0000] 
C3 (L=7)  10/16 (63%)  6/16 (37%)  -  -  - 
Table 4 displays the proportion of individuals picking option 1 and option 2 by contract.  p-values (in brackets) are 
associated with Fishers exact test of differences between contract choices of option 1 (option 2). *, **, *** indicate 
significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level, respectively.  Contracts in bold represent those contracts where the 
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Figure 1 graphically displays the proportion of individuals choosing Option 1 by contract group.  In all three panels 
the contract to the far left (A1, B1, and C1) represent those contracts where EV (O1|I1) < EV (O2|I1).  The other bar 
charts are characterized by EV(O1|I1) > EV(O2|I1). 
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Figure 2 graphically displays the proportion of individuals choosing Option 1 by contract group, under the losses 
treatment.  In all three panels the contract to the far left (A1, B1, and C1) represent those contracts where EV (O1|I1) 
< EV (O2|I1).  The other bar charts are characterized by EV(O1|I1) > EV(O2|I1). 
 
                                                 
 
Endnotes  
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1 For exceptions, see the literature survey in Hubbard (1994). Recent examples that document 
asymmetrical responses to bad versus good news in an empirical framework can be found in 
Caballero and Pindyck (1992), Pindyck and Solimano (1993), and Svensson (2000).   
2 In the parlance of Harrison and List (2004), we conduct “artefactual field experiments.” 
3 While anomalous behavioral tendencies may be attenuated amongst professionals, Haigh and 
List (2005) find an unexpected result in their study of Myopic Loss Aversion (MLA) amongst 
traders and students.  Using a design that extended Gneezy of Potters (1997), they find that 
traders’ behavior is more consistent with MLA than students’ behavior.  MLA rests upon the 
assumption  of  1)  loss  aversion  and  2)  mental  accounting  –  how  financial  transactions  are 
grouped both cross-sectionally and temporally.  Recent efforts have attempted to disentangle the 
effect of mental accounting and loss aversion on MLA (see e.g., Langer and Weber, 2005, Hens 
and  Wohrman,  2006).    These  studies  have  highlighted  the  sensitivity  of  the  findings  on 
assumptions necessary to uncover MLA, and have shown that finding evidence of MLA does not 
necessarily  imply  strong  evidence  of  loss  aversion  by  itself.    Indeed,  given  that  MLA  is  a 
composition  of  factors,  from  the  results  of  Haigh  and  List  (2005)  one  cannot  conclude  that 
professionals exhibit more or less loss aversion than students.  As such, given that the current 
experimental design does not have the temporal accounting exhibited in the MLA studies, we 
maintain our working hypothesis that traders are likely to be less loss averse as illustrated by 
other researchers outlined above. 
4 As detailed below, the number of subjects presented with contract packet A (A1, A2 and A3 
contracts), B (B1, B2 and B3 contracts) and C (C1, C2, C3) varied.  To provide variation across 
H, we randomly allocated some subjects with contracts from A, B, and/or C.    
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9As a further robustness test, we presented a different group of 19 students with a set of 10 
contracts (yielding 190 decisions) whereby one contract was binding to test if the number of 
contract choices had any influence on the contract choice.  Results are similar to those presented 
below so we suppress further discussion.   
6 The findings that results are similar between several contracts being monetarily binding versus 
one contract being binding is consistent with the notion of a reduction of compound lotteries 
(consistent with expected utility theory). It also suggests we have no income effects.   
7 CBOT officials suggested that designing an experiment with an expected payout of $30 was a 
good  approximation  as  to  what  an  average  market  professional  might  expect  to  earn  for  an 
equivalent amount of time on the floor.  In fact, for 30 minutes of their time the average market 
professional earns approximately $47.  The minimum amount earned by a market professional is 
$31 and the maximum is $74. Among the market professionals, approximately 48% reported that 
they traded commodities, 41% traded financial instruments, and 11% traded both.  However, 
because the different assets trade at different times in open outcry (e.g., most commodities trade 
from 9:20 am to 1:15 pm central time and most financial assets from 7:20am to 2:00 pm central 
time), the average floor trader would be working in the pit environment for approximately 5 
hours  and  5  minutes,  suggesting  that  at  the  $30  rate  per  half  an  hour  they  would  earn 
approximately $128,000 per year (based on 250 trading days).  This is considerably more than 
the average amount the medium market professional reported earning to us ($40,000–$49,000).   
8 As discussed below, the number of subjects presented with contract packet A (A1, A2 and A3 
contracts),  B (B1, B2 and B3 contracts) and C (C1, C2, C3) varied.  For example, 24 (18) 
students  (market  professionals)  were  shown  contract  pack  A,  33  (50)  students  (market  
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professionals) were shown contract pack B and 36 (16) students (market professionals) were 
shown contract pack C.  To obtain these decisions, we recruited 75 undergraduate students who 
each made 3-6 decisions (279 total decisions) and 55 market professionals, who each made 3-6 
decisions, providing a total of 252 market professional decisions. 
9 Both theories provide similar advice for each of the other contracts, including A1, since the 
expected value is negative.  While the majority of subjects follow the options model, a full 39% 
of market professionals, for example, violate the options model in A1.  As suggested by an 
anonymous reviewer, when we analyze the proportions investing in option 2 after excluding 
subjects that appear to follow basic rules (i.e., deleting those subjects that always invested in 
round  1),  just  8%  of  market  professionals  fail  to  follow  the  options  model.    Thus,  upon 
jettisoning  data  from  those  agents  who  always  picked  option  1,  we  find  results  even  more 
consistent with the options model.  These results are excluded to conserve space but are available 
upon request. 
10 Overall, the results are also in line with the notion that students are more sensitive than traders 
to parameter changes in the experimental environment.  This is an interesting area for future 
research.   
11 Since we cannot exogenously impose “loss aversion” on agents we stress caveat lector in this 
case, as in the comparison between students and traders.  